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Abstract
Measuring the similarity of two files is an important task in
malware analysis, with fuzzy hash functions being a popular
approach. Traditional fuzzy hash functions are data agnos-
tic: they do not learn from a particular dataset how to deter-
mine similarity; their behavior is fixed across all datasets. In
this paper, we demonstrate that fuzzy hash functions can be
learned in a novel minimax training framework, and that these
learned fuzzy hash functions outperform traditional fuzzy
hash functions at the file similarity task for Portable Exe-
cutable files. In our approach, hash digests can be extracted
from the kernel embeddings of two kernel networks, trained
in a minimax framework, where the roles of players during
training (i.e adversary versus generator) alternate along with
the input data. We refer to this new minimax architecture as
perturbation-consistent. The similarity score for a pair of files
is the utility of the minimax game in equilibrium. Our experi-
ments show that learned fuzzy hash functions generalize well,
capable of determining that two files are similar even when
one of those files was generated using insertion and deletion
operations.
Introduction
File Similarity in Malware Analysis
The rapid proliferation of malware poses a substantial set
of technical and organizational challenges for malware ana-
lysts. For example, for the year 2017, there were more than
121.6 million instances of new malware recorded, i.e., on
average there were about 3.9 new malware instances being
created every second (AV-TEST 2018). While these num-
bers may seem large, it is important to note that most new
malware is not written from scratch. Instead, most new mal-
ware files are only slightly modified versions of previously
known malware. New malware files will often be near-exact
duplicates of previously seen malware. There are several
reasons for this near-duplication, including malware authors
making small changes to bypass new malware defenses, as
well as code reuse and code sharing among malware authors
(Walenstein and Lakhotia 2007).
Given some unknown file, two important questions a mal-
ware analyst might ask are: Is this new file benign or mali-
cious; and, if the file is malicious, what kind of malware is
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it (e.g., ransomware, Trojan, credential stealer, etc.)? Mal-
ware analysts can significantly reduce the burden of answer-
ing these two questions by exploiting the fact that most new
malware is very similar to previously known malware. If we
already had a database of known malware, we could essen-
tially do a nearest neighbor search using our file similarity
metric to query for known files that are similar to our new
unknown file. If, for example, the most similar files in the
database are malicious, we may assume that the new file
is also malicious. And if many of the similar files in the
database are a particular type of malware, we may also as-
sume that the new file is that same type of malware.
Fuzzy Hashing
In the computer security community, file similarity is com-
monly measured using fuzzy hashing functions. A typical
fuzzy hashing algorithm has two parts: (1) a hashing algo-
rithm to generate a hash digest (e.g., the hash value repre-
senting a file), and (2) a comparison algorithm to compute a
similarity metric from a pair of input hash digests (Bass et
al. 2012).
Fuzzy hashing algorithms differ from cryptographic hash
functions (e.g. MD5, SHA256, etc.) in that the output of a
fuzzy hash function is insensitive to small changes in the
input. For example, changing a single bit in the input to
SHA256 will change the output drastically. However, with
typical fuzzy hash functions, changing a single bit will not
affect the output. Ideally, fuzzy hash functions should be as
robust as possible to adversarial and random perturbations.
A well-known fuzzy hash function is ssdeep (Kornblum
2006). Given a file, ssdeep first breaks it up into several
pieces, and then uses a rolling hash function to compute the
digest for each piece. These individual digests are concate-
nated to produce a final fixed-size similarity digest for the
whole file. Given two hash digests, ssdeep will return a score
of between 0 and 100 that expresses a level of confidence
that two files are similar.
Despite ssdeep’s popularity, it has several known weak-
nesses. For example, ssdeep is sensitive to random bit flips
made across an entire file. In fact, if more than 70 bytes of a
file are modified, ssdeep will always return a similarity score
of zero when given the original and modified files as inputs
(Breitinger 2011).
sdhash (Roussev 2010) is another widely used fuzzy hash
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function with increased robustness to random modifications
of the input compared to ssdeep: sdhash can measure that a
file is similar to a modified version of that file even when
up to 1.1% of the file has been modified at random. Un-
like ssdeep, sdhash generates varying length digests (2-3%
of the length of the input). sdhash uses normalized Shan-
non entropy to extract 64-byte sequence features. The ex-
tracted features are hashed and then put into a Bloom filter
(Bloom 1970). For the comparison of two files, Bloom fil-
ters are compared using a Hamming distance measure. The
result is the estimated fraction of Bloom filter features that
the two filters have in common that are not due to chance.
The traditional fuzzy hash function that is most similar
to our work is sahash (Breitinger 2014). The simplistic de-
sign of sahash allows for its similarity score to be a lower
bound on the Levenshtein distance. However, sahash is con-
strained to only fixed-sized inputs and cannot measure the
similarity digests of files with different sizes. sahash works
by concatenating the following sub-hashes: 1) the hash of
the frequency of byte-arrays of files, 2) the hash of the fre-
quency of 4-bit circularly shifted byte-arrays of files 3) a
so-called uneva function. uneva not only counts the fre-
quency of occurrences in the byte-arrays, but it also counts
the frequency of the repeated occurrences, as a measure of
how sporadic the occurrences of a specific byte are. We re-
fer the reader to (Breitinger et. al 2014) for a more detailed
description. Since we train our model using sahash features,
we describe sahash features more in the feature preparation
section.
We don’t intend to provide a panacea to the fuzzy hash
problem. The main novelty of our work is to propose a min-
imax training framework, where fuzzy hash functions can
be learned. We show that learned fuzzy hash functions are
more robust than popular traditional fuzzy hash functions to
modifications of the inputs. We hypothesize that this robust-
ness is due to traditional fuzzy hash functions being data
agnostic, i.e., they don’t learn from data, whereas our fuzzy
hashing function can exploit learned statistical relationships
in the underlying dataset. We also show that the tolerance of
the fuzzy hashing function to file modifications can be im-
plicitly learned from the corpus of data on which the fuzzy
hashing function is trained.
Note that we focus on fixed-size digests to have a differ-
entiable end-to-end mechanism for learning. This choice of
fixed-sized digest helps us to do a fair comparison between
ssdeep, sahash, and our method.
For our dataset, we start with a collection of binary files,
and then modify the bytes of these files at random using a
fuzzer, generating a new collection of perturbed files. Note
that, while we use the term perturbed in our paper to re-
fer to these fuzzed examples in the training data, the term
‘perturbed’ is relative, and the original files can be also con-
sidered to be the perturbed versions of the fuzzed files. We’ll
describe the dataset later on in the paper in our Experiments
section.
Note that while we focus on applications of fuzzy hashing
to file similarity for the purposes of malware analysis, fuzzy
hashing can be applied to many kinds of data, including im-
ages and text.
Fuzzy Hash Functions as Kernel Networks
We view fuzzy hash functions as kernel networks. Inspired
by (Goodfellow 2014) (Bo 2014) (Azarafrooz 2017), we in-
corporate kernel networks into a novel minimax framework.
Our proposed minimax framework shares some similarities
with cycle-consistent minimax frameworks (Zhu 2017) (Yi
2017). However, our approach is different in two ways: 1)
The players of minimax games are kernel networks rather
than neural architectures, and 2) Consistency is expressed
in terms of the roles of the kernel networks w.r.t to the per-
turbed data. We refer to this as ‘perturbation consistency’
because networks alternate their input data in each stage of
learning, and whichever network uses the perturbed data as
input will play the role of an adversary. We found such con-
sistency to be crucial for satisfying the end-to-end symmet-
rical properties of a learned fuzzy hash function (we explain
this further in the Learning Fuzzy Functions section).
Feature Preparation
Our proposed methodology works at the byte level and,
therefore, data preparation requires no special parser. Given
a file with byte-array f, we generate a perturbed file with
byte-array f’ using random ρ-bit substitutions s.t. 0 <
f ⊕ f’ < ρ, without changing the physical size or the run-
time behavior of files, where ⊕ is XOR operator. This is not
to say that a file is randomly selected from Hamming sphere
of radius ρ, since some points in the Hamming sphere do
not remain truthful to the functionality of f. In other words,
we avoid flipping bits that are essential to the functionality
of the underlying executable files. The choice of using a bit
substitution operation is to guarantee that the functionality
of the perturbed version remains intact. Enabling perturba-
tions with other edit operators, deletion and insertion, re-
quires special care to avoid changing an executable file in
such a way that it is no longer able to be executed. As ex-
plained later, we prepare test data in which files are fuzzed
using deletion and insertion operations.
Similar to sahash, for each byte-array f, we prepare fea-
tures x by concatenating the histogram of byte counts with
the histogram of byte counts after a circular shift:
x = hist(f) | hist(f >> 4) (1)
, where f >> n denotes n-bit circular shift to the right,
hist(f) is the histogram of byte counts and | is the con-
catenation operator. Since each byte can be represented as a
value between 0 and 255, x is a 512 dimensional vector.
For example, the zero-based indexes of 255 and 511 rep-
resent the counted numbers of byte occurrences of 0xff
in the original bytes and circularly shifted bytes, respec-
tively. A more aggressive feature selection is also possible,
where histograms of byte counts for other shift values n : n
mod 8 6= 0 are incorporated into the features. Similar fea-
ture selection is done for the perturbed byte-array f’ to get
x’. The pairs (x,x’) ∈ X,X’ are then used to learn fuzzy
hash functions.
Learning Fuzzy Functions
sahash (Breitinger et. al 2014) digest gets calculated as:
x mod m where m = 2max(8,d
log2 l
2 e) (2)
, where l is the length of f. The similarity measure for
the sahash digests is then related to the maximum number
of byte frequencies that are different among both the cir-
culated and the original byte-array. This simply provides a
lower bound for the edit distance between the files. Note
that edit distance between two files is defined as the mini-
mum number of substitutions, insertions, and deletions that
are required to transform one file to another. The value of
modulus m is selected to be file-size dependent for a suit-
able balance between compressibility and robustness. This,
however limits its applicability to different file sizes. Instead
of file-size dependent modulo operations, we learn a high-
order non-linear function from the training data pairs X,X’.
By doing so, similarity measure between digests finds intu-
itive mathematical interpretation in terms of maximum mean
discrepancy (MMD) measure (Gretton 2012).
To incorporate learning mechanisms in fuzzy hash func-
tions, we need to extend the fuzzy hash function properties
to include the following:
• Differentiability: The desire to learn from the structure of
the data X,X’ = (x1,x′1), (x2,x
′
2), ..., (xn,x
′
n) asks for
a differentiable network. For example, we cannot use the
modulo operators used by sahash.
• End-to-end symmetrical property: We use a minimax
framework with two different functions (G,D) to com-
pute the similarity measure δ. This, however, requires an
end-to-end symmetrical behavior, formalized below:
δ(G(x), D(x’)) = δ(G(x’), D(x)) (3)
Note this is more specific than the symmetrical proper-
ties of similarity/distance measures. The MMD similarity
measure used in our paper is symmetric by default.
To achieve the introduced properties above and those in-
troduced in the introduction section, we model the fuzzy
hash function selection using kernel minimax frameworks.
This leads to differentiable non-linear embeddings. We view
these embeddings as fuzzy hash digests which turn out to be
robust against perturbations, thanks to the qualities of MMD
distance measure and the minimax training. In order to
achieve the end-to-end symmetrical property, a perturbation-
consistent version of the minimax framework is presented.
Kernel embedding in a Minimax Framework
Let (h,h’) denotes the digest of pairs (x,x’) with similarity
measures of δ(h,h’). We view the digests in our framework
as the kernel embeddings of (x,x’). This view establishes
the connection between the required similarity measures of
the fuzzy hash functions and maximum mean discrepancy
(MMD) measures (albeit a stochastic version). The key idea
behind MMD measure is the fact that one can measure the
difference between distributions p(X) and p(X’) by linear
witness in Hilbert space such as:
sup
f∈H
E[ψ(X)]− E[ψ(X’)]
δ(h,h’)
(4)
, without using density estimators over the original do-
mains (X,X’), where ψ is a function living in a reproduc-
ing kernel Hilbert space (RKHS) H . Conveniently, in the
process, we get the kernel embedding as the digest of the
fuzzy hash functions. This provides digests and similarity
measures in one shot. We further achieve learnable param-
eters and robustness by incorporating the kernel networks
into minimax frameworks followed by a simple mathemat-
ical trick introduced in (Bo 2014) (Azarafrooz 2017): take
the derivative of Eq. 4 to get gradients and then reconstruct
a new network with fresh learnable parameters.
Before we continue with demonstrating the derivation of
the new network with learnable parameters, we have to touch
on a few definitions and one main theorem.
Definition 1 (kernel mean embedding). Due to the repro-
ducing property of H , the expectation of any function ψ in
RKHS H with respect to random variable X can be com-
puted as an inner product with its so called kernel mean em-
bedding E[k(X, .)]:
E[ψ(X)] = 〈ψ,E[k(X, .)]〉 (5)
where k is the kernel associated with RKHS H .
Definition 2 A kernel k(x,x’) : X × X → R is positive
definite (PD), when for all n > 1 and x1, x2, .., xn ∈ X and
c1, ..., cn ∈ R, we have
∑
i,j cicjk(xi,xj) ≥ 0.
Theorem 1 Duality between Kernels and Random Pro-
cesses (Devinatz 1953): If k(x,x’) is a positive definite
kernel, then there exits a set Ω, a measure P on Ω, and ran-
dom function φW(x) : X → R from L2(Ω,P), such that
k(x,x’) =
∫
Ω
φW(x)φW(x
′)dP(W).
Reconstructing a minimax network Using Eq. 4 and Eq.
5, we note that gradient of the similarity measure is:
∂δ
∂ψ = E[k(X, .)]− E[k(X’, .)] (6)
Applying Theorem 1 to Eq. 6, followed by Monte Carlo
approximation analogous to random Laplace feature maps
(Rahimi 2007), we arrive at the following gradient terms:
φ˜(x)− φ˜(x’), φ˜(x) ≡ exp(−xT w1)...exp(−xT ws)s (7)
where wj are drawn from a proper distribution. In our pa-
per, it is drawn from Gaussian P(w) = exp(−‖w‖
2
2/2)
(2pi)d/2
. We
also investigated Laplace features maps (more on this can
be found in the Appendix).
Now we are in the position to construct a new
parametrized learnable framework by the linear combination
of the first-order gradient terms in Eq. 7. To implement this,
we treat the gradient terms as the activation of the first layer
in our network (note the non-linearity of the kernel embed-
ding) followed by one more layer with softmax activation.
We use batch normalization immediately after the first layer
followed by dropout during training. This completes the de-
sign description for both involved networks in the minimax
training framework, the generator G and adversary D.
In the well-known minimax process used by GAN (Good-
fellow 2014), a generator tries to sample from a desired
probability space, given random noise as input. An ad-
versary then evaluates the generated sample by compar-
ing it against the real data, according to a suitable distance
measure, such as Jenson-Shannon, Wasserstein, MMD, etc.
However, in our case, the inputs for both generator and ad-
versary belong to the space of training data X,X’. Param-
eters θ and φ get adjusted by the gradient flowing through
both networks, in every stage of the game.
Figure 1: Scheme of the proposed perturbation-consistent
minimax training: Every stage of learning includes 2 rounds.
Round 1 : Gθ uses x as input data, Dφ uses x’. Gθ plays
the role of the generator and Dφ plays the role of adversary.
Round 2 : Dφ uses x as input data, Gθ uses x’. Dφ plays
the role of the generator and Gθ plays the role of adversary.
Both Gθ and Dφ backpropagate gradients to adjust their pa-
rameters, θ and φ. Learning continues similarly with the next
batch of data until convergence is achieved.
min
θ∈Θ
δ(Gθ(x), Dφ(x’)) (8)
If the minimax characteristic of the framework is not clear
from Eq. 8 please refer to the definition of MMD distance in
Eq. 4 (find sup/max in Eq. 4 and min in Eq. 8). The embed-
ded features of either Gθ or Dφ can be considered the hash
digest of resulting fuzzy hash function, with the similarity
measure being the utility of the minimax game in equilib-
rium.
To induce end-to-end symmetry, we train in a
perturbation-consistent way, where the role of players
in the minimax training (i.e discriminator versus generator)
alternates along with their input data. In other words,
during each state of training, we alternate input data to both
networks, and whoever has access to the perturbed data X’
in that round, plays the role of an adversary. This is visually
illustrated in Fig. 1. We refer to our proposed method as
adversarial kernel hash (akash).
Experiments
Data Preparation To show that learning from data can re-
sult in an improved fuzzy hash function relative to traditional
fuzzy hashing, we base our study on a set of Portable Exe-
cutable (PE) files. The PE file format describes a data struc-
ture that encapsulates the information necessary for the Win-
dows OS loader to manage the wrapped executable code.
We curated a training set of 80 thousand malicious PEs,
fuzzed using the aforementioned ρ-bit substitutions mech-
anism with ρ selected uniformly random from range 1 to
500. We generate two types of test data. One set of test
data is generated using the explained flip substitution, while
the other set is generated using LIEF (Quarkslab 2017).
LIEF (Library to Instrument Executable Formats) is an open
source library capable of parsing and manipulating PE files
using advanced edit operations.
We avoided using LIEF for preparing the training data set
for two reasons: 1) In order to show that even training over
the Hamming sphere of permissible bit-substitutions gener-
alizes to deletion and insertion edit operations. 2) Advanced
edit operations using tools like LIEF can still sometimes
generate a fuzzed PE file that is corrupted in such a way
as to be unexecutable. However, our bit substitution mecha-
nism is guaranteed to keep the functionality of the PE intact.
Hyperparameter tuning The best results were achieved
by setting batch size to 1000, dropout to 0.75 and learning
rates to 5e-4, for both generator and adversary networks.
We found our experiments to be sensitive to the batch size.
Also, we set the embedding size to 512, without performing
any tuning, in order to keep the digest size consistent with
sahash. For optimization, we used (adaptive moment estima-
tion) Adam stochastic optimization. We trained the model
for 5000 epochs.
Thresholds sahash uses the absolute value of the differ-
ence between the uneva of the files in order to reduce false
positives. While it is possible to incorporate the uneva ar-
rays into input data x, we chose not to do so, in order to have
a fair comparison between akash and sshash. Similar to sa-
hash, we call two files similar if they fall below a certain
threshold for δ (Eq. 4) and above a threshold for uneva.
While sahash selected the threshold to optimal value of 97,
we achieved zero false positives by smaller value of thresh-
old 80.
Visual Comparisons of Robustness To compare the ro-
bustness of akash with other fuzzy hash techniques, we plot-
ted the effect of various types of perturbations on the dis-
tance measures in Fig. 2 and Fig. 3. In all these plots, the y
axis in ssdeep and sdhash are (100-confidence score of find-
ing files similar) and (100-estimate of the fraction of com-
mon features between files) respectively, as a proxy for their
distance measures. The y axis in sahash provides a lower
bound estimate on the edit distance. The y axis in akash is
representative of distance measure δ, described in Eq. 4 as
the utility of the minimax game at equilibrium. The x axis in
Fig. 2 represents the number of bit-substitutions performed
in randomly selected files. However, the modified file has
the same physical size and functionality as the unmodified
file. Disregarding the plot scales, the large spikes in the fig-
ures correspond to the events where fuzzy hash functions
are being bypassed, i.e., where the fuzzy hash functions fail
to consider two similar files to be similar. Lower numbers
of spikes implies more robustness. It can be observed that
akash is consistently more robust than the other fuzzy hash
functions. Despite training on only ρ-bit substitutions within
0 < ρ < 500, Fig. 2 demonstrates that akash’s performance
generalizes to far more than 500 modifications.
Figure 2: The effect of increase in the number of (per-
missible) bits substitutions on the distance measures. The
smoother the trends, the more robust the fuzzy hasher.
Figure 3: The effect of random insertion/deletion operations
on the distance measures. The smoother the trends, the more
robust the fuzzy hasher. Notably, training over bit substitu-
tions results in a fuzzy hasher that generalizes well to inser-
tions and deletions.
More interestingly, Fig. 3 shows that akash generalizes
well to even more advanced edit operations such as inser-
tions and deletions. The x axis in Fig. 3 represent the events
with random action selected from the insertion and deletion
actions available to LIEF. The insertion operations include
the following LIEF actions: ‘append overlay’, ‘append im-
port, ‘add section’ and ‘append section’. The deletion oper-
ations include the following LIEF actions: ‘remove the sig-
nature’ and ‘remove debug’.
Table 1: True Negative Ratio: bit-substitions
Fuzzy Hash akash ssdeep sahash sdhash
TN % 97.9 86.3 31 93.4
Table 2: True Negative Ratio: Insertion and deletion
Fuzzy Hash akash ssdeep sahash sdhash
Overall % 85 96.3 28 90.1
Insertion % 88 96 42 93.4
Deletion % 75 99 36 77
We also plotted the byte size of the modifications associ-
ated with the performed edit actions. Fig. 3 shows that akash
is robust even to the cases where files are generated via dele-
tion and insertion operators rather than bit substitutions.
Performance We note that sdhash (unlike akash, ssdeep,
and sahash) generates varying length digests (2-3% of the
length of the input). Therefore, a fair comparison between
sdhash and the rest of the mentioned fuzzy hashers is not
possible, but we report the sdhash results to be comprehen-
sive. Table 1 and Table 2 shows the result of comparison
over a randomly selected set of 10 thousand benign and ma-
licious hashes. We use the recommended threshold of 21 for
sdhash, 50 for ssdeep and the exact thresholds of sahash re-
ported in (Breitinger et. al 2014). Table 1 shows that akash
outperforms the traditional fuzzy hashing functions, when
perturbations are induced using bit-substitution operations.
Table 2 shows that, despite being trained on the space of per-
missible bit-substitutions, akash generalizes well even to the
cases where perturbations are induced using insertions and
deletions.
We also experimented with more advanced edit opera-
tion such as compression. Specifically, we used the UPX
pack/unpack compression action in LIEF when conducting
this new experiment, and found zero detections in this case,
as is reported in Table 3. This result is expected, since com-
pression changes the structure of the original files in much
more substantial way than substitution, insertion, and dele-
tion operations.
False Positives In order to measure the false positive rate,
we selected a random set of n=10000 malicious hashes.
We then selected a random selection of 10000 pairs from
the possible set of combinations n× n-1/2. The results are
reported in Table 4. We performed similar experiments for a
set of benign hashes. The numbers are consistent with Table
4 as well. We found the true positive ratio for both sahash
(using the same exact settings in the original paper) and ss-
deep to be the same: 98.3%, which is lower than the perfect
Table 3: True Negative Ratio for Compression Operations
Fuzzy Hash akash ssdeep sahash sdhash
UPX % 0 20 20 14.2
Table 4: True Positive Ratio
Fuzzy Hash akash ssdeep sahash sdhash
TP % 100 98.3 98.3 100
100% performance of akash and sdhash. Results in Table 4
shows that akash performs as good as sdhash, in terms of
ratio of false positives, despite having fixed-size digest.
Conclusion and Future Work
We introduced a novel minimax training framework capable
of learning to perform fuzzy hashing for the purposes of file
similarity. The kernel embeddings of the minimax players
can be used as hash digests, and the utility of the minimax
game in equilibrium provides the similarity score. As shown
in our experiments, the trained fuzzy hash function outper-
forms widely used traditional fuzzy hash functions when
perturbations are induced using bit substitutions. Also, de-
spite being trained on the space of permissible bit substitu-
tions, the trained fuzzy hash function generalizes well even
to the cases where perturbations are induced using insertions
and deletions.
We ran our experiments with PE files, but we suspect our
approach can be fruitfully applied to other kinds of data,
such as images or audio. For example, one could modify a
collection of images using cropping, color changes, and ge-
ometric transformations, and then use our technique to mea-
sure the similarity of the modified and original images.
For files in particular, an interesting future direction is to
investigate to what extent a trained model is generalizable to
perturbations involving more advanced edit operations, such
as compression, instead of simple bit substitutions.
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Appendix
We also experimented with Laplace feature maps with sam-
ples drawn Exponential and Levi. But we found the Fourier
features maps to perform much better than Laplace feature
maps. The Laplace feature maps led to fuzzy hashers that
have an impractical FP ratio. This is an interesting obser-
vation since semigroup kernels associated with Laplace fea-
ture maps provide a much more intuitive interpretation than
Fourier Features maps. This is because one can consider his-
tograms X as groups closed over the + operation. Since byte
counts can only get positive values. We did however, find
that the convergence for Laplace Feature maps with samples
drawn from exponential to be much smoother.
Definition 3 (Abelian semigroup). A semigroup (X, ◦) is a
nonempty set X equipped with an associative composition ◦,
i.e for any x,x’,x’’ ∈ X : x◦(x’◦x’’) = (x◦x’)◦x’’
and a identity element e, i.e, for any X ∈ X : x ◦ e = x. For
an abelian semigropu, the composition is commutative, i.e.
for any x,x’ ∈ X : x ◦ x’ = x’ ◦ x.
Definition 4 (Kernels on Abelian semigroups). A function
k : X × X → R is a positive definite (PD) kernel function
on an abelian semigroup (X, ◦) if k(x,x’) = Φ(x ◦ x’)
where Φ : x → R is a PD function, i.e for any x1, ...,xn ∈
X, any real-valued scalars c1, ...,cn, the following holds:∑n
i,j=1 cicjΦ(xi,xj) ≥ 0.
The following theorem establishes a one-to-one corre-
spondence between semigroup kernels and probability den-
sities on Rd, via the Laplace transform.
Theorem 1 (Duality between semigroup kernels and
random processes): For every bounded continuous ker-
nel function k(x,x’) on the Abelian Semigroup (Rd+,+)
there exits a non-negative measure w with associated
random Laplace construction φW s.t that k(x, x′) =∫
RD+
φW(x)φW(x′)dP(W).
